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Abstract: As markets become increasingly more competitive firms systematically move 
away from hierarchical integrated supply chains  toward fragmented networks of strategic 
partnerships with external partners. Business practice indicate a growing number of busi-
nesses relying on the platform organizational structures. For such constructs superior pro-
duct quality and customer appeal maintain necessary but it is the breadth of the ecosystem 
of related product and services that has become a prerequisite for success. It implies the 
focus on third parties, complementors, who develop and deliver diverse content to plat-
forms as well as enhance platform’s generativity. Although complementary relations should 
be the main reference  while considering the network dynamics from different angles, the 
attention in the extant research gravitates toward inter-platform competition with platform 
owners as the central object. Thus, with the objective to contribute to the emerging lite-
rature on industry platforms, this conceptual article discusses main challenges concerned 
with orchestrating arm’s length relationships with complementors, by departing from plat-
form-owner-centered approach and focusing on behavior of interdepended contributors. 
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Introduction
Structural transformation induced by a pervasive information and communication tech-
nology intertwined with global dispersion of supply chains has been labeled as a third 
globalization, a globalization reconfigured by digital platforms and the cloud [Kenney, 
Zysman 2016]. Algorithmically driven reorganization enables efficient conversion of 
broad human efforts and consumer assets into monetized goods. Observable  rise of 
digitally defined businesses is gaining considerable scholarly attention across diverse 
fields of technology management, innovation management, strategic management, in-
dustrial economics [e.g. de Reuver, Sorensen, Basole 2017; Wareham, Fox, Cano Giner 
2014; McIntyre, Srinivasan 2017]. On-going discussions gravitate toward technologically 
framed business choices that shape the competitive landscape, define the influence of 
variety of autonomous agents on value creation, delivery, and determine the range of 
control over the compensation for work performed by networks of value co-creators [Ja-
cobides, Cennamo, Gawer 2015; Venkatraman et al. 2014]. It is argued that in the current 
competitive context superior product quality and customer appeal maintain necessary 
but it is the breadth of the ecosystem of related product and services that has become 
a prerequisite for success [McIntyre, Srinivasan 2017]. Hence, complementary relations 
are being brought up front while considering the interplay between value creation and 
value capture within the interfirm network [Schreieck, Wiesche, Krcmar 2017; Cennamo, 
Santalo 2013]. There is a growing body of literature on strategies for exploiting network 
effects, however rarely addresses the dynamic tension between inter- and intra-platform 
competition. Thus, with the objective to contribute to the emerging literature on indu-
stry platforms, this conceptual article discusses main challenges concerned with orche-
strating arm’s length relationships with complementors, by departing from platform-ow-
ner-centered approach and focusing on behavior of interdepended contributors.
Strategic management perspective on complementary 
relations
From the strategic management perspective organizations can create value in an “exc-
lusive” manner by combining own internally developed resources and capabilities or 
“collectively” with the use of external resources and capabilities accessed through inter
-organizational relationships [Lavie 2007; Najda-Janoszka 2016]. Extant research and ob-
served business practice indicate however that firms are rarely able, or want, to perform 
all their activities in-house [Lavie 2007; Niemczyk, Stańczyk-Hugiet, Jasiński 2012; Cza-
kon 2012]. Hence, firms engage in various inter-organizational constellations driven by
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expectations of additional opportunities for value creation and capture that derive from 
the access to extended set of resources and capabilities owned/controlled by partners. 
Complementary resources provided by cooperating partners may directly contribute to 
firm performance through enrichment, strategic bundling, and/or absorption by inter-
nalization [Lavie 2007]. Moreover, participating in collaborative endeavor can generate 
synergies not only at the level of the resource base but also across activity systems [Ford 
et al. 2011]. However, potential additional benefits come with potential additional costs 
[negotiation, adaptation, maintenance, etc.) for parties involved. Evaluation becomes 
challenging as it involves a broader context of other business relationships of a given 
firm [Hakansson, Snehota 2005]. 
Other studies turned the attention to the importance of the access to complemen-
tary assets for successful implementation of innovations by discriminating between ge-
neric and specialized ones [Teece 2001]. It is argued that while acquiring generic assets 
usually does not cause major problems, gaining access to specialized complementary 
assets is more challenging and time consuming. Specialization of assets implies special 
purpose, irreversible investments that raise the risks for the engaged party. Thus, it is 
assumed that the control over complementary assets gains in importance with a greater 
degree of asset specialization. Further, the problem of in-sourcing innovative activity 
was addressed with an open innovation paradigm, according to which firms make a gre-
ater strategic use of external knowledge (outside-in approach) and simultaneously deci-
de to externalize certain components of their intellectual property [Chesbrough 2003]. 
By opening up an innovation process to complementors [customers, suppliers, univer-
sities, competitors], a formerly protected know how becomes a means for knowledge 
exchange, which is expected to ultimately lead to additional monetary and strategic 
benefits [Dahlander, Gann 2010; Chesbrough 2003]. However, given that open innova-
tion model does not imply externalization of all possessed knowledge assets, the main 
challenge concerns ability to simultaneously protect and share proprietary components 
of know-how [Dahlander, Gann 2010]. An appealing approach discussed in the literature 
implies aligning product architecture with intellectual property according to a modular 
design [Henkel, Baldwin, Shih 2013]. Extending modularization from physical production 
process to intellectual property allows for managing a right balance between systemic 
and autonomous innovations triggering product development. Although partners may 
innovate on modules, a focal firm maintains proprietary those areas of knowledge that 
are sensitive and necessary for innovating at the product architecture level [Henkel et al. 
2013]. Hence, modularity is commonly recognized as one of the fundamental drivers of 
the rise of platform businesses [Hidding, Williams, Sviokla 2011].
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Platform defined business activity
Based on the logic of a relatively stable core coupled with variable peripherals [Bald-
win & Woodard 2009], platform can be seen as a vehicle for combining scale and scope 
economics together with product differentiation at the same time. Although platform 
logic is not new in the management field and business practice [Rochet, Tirole 2006; Ja-
cobides et al. 2015], the astounding advances in digitalization enhanced potential and 
accelerated omnipresence of platforms in the current environment. Hence, the concept 
evolved from a vehicle for developing product portfolios serving different market needs 
[platforms bounded inside firms], to markets enabling direct transactions across diffe-
rent customer groups [two-sided, multi-sided platforms], and to industry level structures 
generating innovation through derivative applications, developed by external comple-
mentors (industry platforms) (Table 1). 
Table. 1. Platform types
Category Definition Distinctive 
focus
author
Internal plat-
forms
Internal system of production enabling 
recombination of components within the 
firm boundaries
Product family Piezunka [2011]
Multi-sided 
platforms
Markets enabling direct transactions 
across different customer groups charac-
terized by network effects between these 
groups. 
transactions Jacobides et al. 
[2015, p. 18]
Industry plat-
forms
Building blocks [they can be products, 
services or technologies] that act as a 
foundation upon which other firms de-
velop complementary innovations
innovations Gawer [2009, p. 45]
Source: author’s own work.
Observed fast diffusion of platforms across industries [e.g. telecommunication finan-
ce, transport, healthcare, tourism) refers to those last types allowing for capitalizing on 
network effects [Gawer 2014; Eisenmann, Parker, Van Alstyne 2011]. Given that multi-si-
ded platforms and industry platforms bring together many user groups [end-customers, 
suppliers, third-parties – complementors) the value of those platforms increases with 
the number of users in the same user group (direct network externalities)  as well as with 
the size of a different user group (indirect network externalities) [Katz, Shapiro 1994]. 
Such network dynamics leads to a basic premise that platforms expected to be popular 
end up more popular [Katz, Shapiro 1994], and to a generally predicted outcome labeled 
as “winner-take-all”, meaning that platform owners (holding property rights over plat-
form) capture most of the value being created in the by participating parties [Cennamo, 
Santalo 2013].
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Orchestrating networks of complementors
Businesses relying on the platform organizational structure have to manage the value 
creation and capture that occurs outside the company, in a broad network [Parker, Van 
Alstyne, Jiang 2017]. Thus, the main focus is on third parties, complementors, who deve-
lop and deliver diverse content (e.g. apps, plug-ins, extensions etc.), as platform growth is 
not limited by the necessity for developing proprietary assets [Parker et al. 2016]. 
Building on self-reinforcing effects of network dynamics there is a common agreed 
that the main mechanisms driving a platform’s value are the increase in the installed 
user base and the availability of complementary assets [Cennamo, Santalo 2013]. Thus, 
striving to bring multiple sides on board as quickly as possible [Rochet, Tirole 2006], 
platforms encounter a key dilemma labeled as “chicken-and-egg-problem” [Caillard, Jul-
lien 2003] as getting interest of one side depends on the number of users at the other 
side. Platform owners, as property right holders, have the right to determine who can 
participate in the platform’s network, determine the rules of the platform [Eisenmann, 
Parker, Van Alstyne 2006], but the relationship with complementors is distinct from the 
one with suppliers –  instead of a principal-agent dependency there is an arm’s length 
relation [Tiwana, Konsynsky, Bush 2010]. Hence, the important challenge for platform 
owners concerns an effective way for encouraging complementors users in the absence 
of formal roles and hierarchical control structures. Extant research highlight the need to 
empower complementors through orchestration that aims at defining core architecture 
and transfer design capability to complementors [von Hippel, Katz 2002]. Such transfer 
occurs through boundary resources defined as “software tools, regulations that serve 
as the interface for the arm’s length relationship between the platform owner and the 
application developer” [Ghazawneh, Hendfridsson 2013, p. 174]. Hence, boundary reso-
urces are often referred to as central strategic tools for managing cooperation and com-
petition in platform ecosystems. Recognizing the importance of boundary resources for 
understanding platform dynamics, some scholars argue that the point of attention sho-
uld be shifted from the core of the platform to boundary resources [Hendfridsson, By-
gstad 2013]. Nevertheless, transforming organizational resources into platform bounda-
ry resources requires time and effort, as well as it triggers competing concerns whether 
to keep a resource proprietary as a source of competitive advantage in a given market 
[Svahn, Mathiassen, Lindgren 2017]. Further, even though a platform successfully trans-
formed resources into boundary ones, complementors may not necessarily use them in 
expected mode and scale. Depending on the complexity of the developed solution it 
may take time to utilize boundary resources in an efficient manner. According to Kapoor 
and Agarwal [2017], it is the platform specific experience gathered by complementors 
through the process of learning by doing (trial and error experimentation, accumulation 
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of new capabilities) that has a direct influence on their ability to sustain superior perfor-
mance. Moreover, experienced contributors may use various strategies for exploiting 
boundary resources beyond the initially designed field, which may negatively affect the 
performance of the platform owner [Karhu, Gustafsson 2015]. Thus, a well thought-out 
cooperation in the process of developing boundary resources appears critical as well as 
a deep understanding the design and usage of boundary resources by both sides – plat-
form owners and complementors. 
An emerging literature on platforms have discussed various strategies enabling ra-
pid growth of installed base of participants. Most of those propositions refer to varia-
tion in pricing [e,g, Hagiu 2005], subsidizing one side of the platform [e.g. Eisenman et. 
al 2006], exclusive contracting [e.g. Armstrong, Wright 2007]. Existing studies provided 
interesting insights, however fragmented, since all those strategies have been investi-
gated separately driven by the assumption that platforms introduce one dominant gro-
wth strategy at a time [Cennamo, Santalo 2013].  Addressing the gap, Cennamo, Santalo 
[2013] examined platforms implementing simultaneously two growth strategies aimed 
at managing  complementary goods, one focused on improving content by stimulating 
competition among complementors, and the second focused on outcompeting rivals by 
securing exclusive platform applications. Obtained findings confirmed that combining 
different strategies for a rapid growth of networks generates strategic tradeoffs, which 
represent hidden constraints to “winner-take-all” approach. In result a narrow, intense 
focus on the network growth may instead undermine the very performance of a plat-
form. Hence, there is a need for a more nuanced view on the intra-platform competition 
between complementors – as there is so many of them with often similar value propo-
sitions – and between the platform and complementors over the value created. There 
is a growing literature addressing the issue of inter-platform competition [e.g. Boudreau 
2010; Eisenmann et al. 2011; Rochet, Tirole 2006], while the intra-platform competition 
remains relatively underexplored [Kapoor, Agarwal 2017; Tiwana 2015]. A recent study 
addressing this gap has examined interaction between value capture mechanisms used 
by platform owners and complementors’ incentives to co-create value in the platform 
network [Schreieck et al. 2017]. Authors identified three broad mechanisms used for cap-
turing value:
 · Absorption – platform owner extends the core with functionalities or whole applica-
tions formerly offered by complementors (acquisition, imitation, extension),
 · Co-selling – platform owner support complementors in selling their products (bun-
dling, branding, certification, customer enablement),
 · Verticalization – platform owner develops and implements vertical use cases to-
gether with complementors (customization to specific industries).
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The findings indicated both reinforcing (co-selling) and alleviating (absorption and 
verticalization) effects on value creation. Such insights inform the general debate on the 
degree of platform openness, defined through technological features as well as thro-
ugh the perception of current and potential complementors [Boudreau 2010]. Despite 
an open provision of boundary resources (module interfaces) the intra-platform com-
petitive dynamics may restrict the perceived freedom for complementors [Schreieck 
et al. 2017]. The role of perception in the decision making by complementors is to a 
large extent unexplored research area. Further, the business practice has confirmed 
that openness comes with a price. Although a very high degree of openness encourage 
complementors and enhances platform’s generativity, it intensifies intra-platform com-
petition between contributors and also makes difficult to control all activities and outco-
mes in the network [Benlian et al. 2015; Casadesus-Masanell, Halaburda 2014]. 
Conclusions 
A review of extant research provides an interesting picture for designing further stu-
dies on platform defined businesses. Available findings as well as arguments presented 
in several recent studies suggest a privileged position of platform owners in business 
structures as well as in the scientific inquiry. Complementors, although defined as criti-
cal to the value creation within the platform ecosystem, have received significantly less 
attention. Scholars tend to focus on strategies used by platform firms to attract com-
plementors and to compete against other rival platforms. There are scarce studies that 
provide insights into the performance of complementors, used competitive strategies, 
their interrelations within the platform as well as with the other market agents. Lacking 
understanding of how complementors create and capture value may not be without si-
gnificance for effective orchestration of platform activities. Moreover, as platform design 
businesses become more and more complex and highly digitized, they exhibit various 
innovation dynamics on different levels of their technical architecture.  Each level may 
contain different components, hence different networks of complementors, although 
it is also possible that some complementors may bridge across those levels. Conside-
ring such complexity it becomes even more evident that complementors should receive 
more scholarly attention that embraces not only technical issues but also perception 
that underlies further decision process. Further, shifting from a platform ownership-cen-
tric perspective it could be also promising to focus more on the actual linkage between 
platform and complementors, and conceptualize platform dynamics in terms of distribu-
ted actors that collectively tune boundary resources. Such a shift can enrich the picture 
by providing opportunity to observe and analyze strategizing on both sides – platform 
owners and complementors. 
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